As Interpretation No. 582 did not declare whether the said interpretation should be effective retroactively or whether those precedents declared as unconstitutional should become void from a specified date, the time force and effect shall therefore be determined by determining the scope of the general force and effect except for the case in respect of which the original petition for interpretation was filed.　In other words, from the date of the interpretation concerned, various levels of courts shall abide by the intent of the said interpretation in hearing and deciding relevant cases.　As for the criminal cases already pending in various levels of courts prior to the date of J.Y. Interpretation No. 582, the application of said Interpretation shall be limited to those cases whose finding of facts involves the use of a co-defendant’s statement as evidence supporting the guilt of another co-defendant.

　　　 It should be first noted that the Petitioner of this Interpretation, i.e., the Supreme Court, in exercising its authority of unifying the application of a particular law or regulation, was in doubt about the time force and effect, as well as the scope, of J. Y. Interpretation No. 582.　Therefore, the petition for a supplementary interpretation was not only rightfully filed in accordance with Article 5-I (i) of the Act of Interpretation Procedure for Grand Justices, but this Court also found it necessary to render a supplementary interpretation.　The petition is hence accepted.

　　　 An interpretation rendered by this Court after conducting a judicial review based on a petition filed by the people shall, in principle, take effect as of the date of the interpretation; and any law or regulation declared as unconstitutional by the said interpretation shall, under the principle of stability of the law, cease to be effective as of the date on which the interpretation comes into effect.　In order to provide the petitioner with a remedy, however, an interpretation rendered by this Court based on a petition filed by the people shall also take effect as to the case in respect of which the original petition for interpretation was filed.　As regards the petitioner against whom a final and conclusive judgment was rendered, the interpretation may be used as a ground for retrial or extraordinary appeal, which has been made clear by J. Y. Interpretations Nos. 177 and 185.

　　　 Where a substantive criminal law based on which a final criminal decision was made is declared by an interpretation of this Court as unconstitutional due to violation of fundamental human rights, it should be taken into consideration whether the said interpretation should take effect retroactively.　However, the precedents declared by J.Y. Interpretation No. 582 as unconstitutional, e.g., Precedent S.T. No. 2423 (Sup. Ct., 1942) and Precedent T.S.T. No. 419 (Sup. Ct., 1957), are criminal procedural law precedents which have been in existence for years.　The criminal cases related thereto are simply innumerable.　Should extraordinary appeals be brought under the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that said precedents are unconstitutional, the results would have devastating effects on the social order and public good.　Therefore, other than the case in respect of which the original petition for interpretation was filed, as to which the said interpretation shall have a retroactive effect, the interpretation does not have a general retroactivity.

　　　 Additionally, a constitutional interpretation rendered by this Court shall have binding force upon various organs of the State and its people.　As of the date of the interpretation, various organs shall, in handling the matters related thereto, follow the intent of the interpretation.　This is known as the general force and effect of an interpretation rendered by this Court, as has been made clear by J. Y. Interpretations Nos. 185 and 188.　Considering the preservation of the stability of the law, as well as the protection of the defendants’ fundamental rights, the application of J. Y. Interpretation No. 582 shall be limited to those criminal cases already pending in various levels of courts prior to the date of said Interpretation whose finding of facts involves the use of a co-defendant’s statement as evidence supporting the guilt of another co-defendant.　Article 287-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as augmented on February 6, 2003, and implemented on September 1, 2003, provides, “Where the court deems proper, it may ex officio or upon the application by a party or defense attorney, separate or consolidate the proceedings regarding the investigation of evidence or arguments for co-defendants.　Under the circumstances described in the preceding paragraph, if it is necessary to protect the rights of the accused because of conflicting interests between the co-defendants, the court shall separate the relevant investigations or arguments.”　Article 287-2 thereof provides, “Where the court investigates a co-defendant for a case concerning the accused, the provisions concerning a witness shall apply mutatis mutandis to the co-defendant.”　The aforesaid provisions are consistent with the intention of J. Y. Interpretation No. 582.　Therefore, it should also be noted that it is unnecessary to apply the said Interpretation to those cases in respect of which trial procedures have been conducted pursuant to the aforesaid provisions after the implementation of the said law.

　　　 In addition, any precedent against the intention of an interpretation rendered by this Court shall become null and void as of the date of the interpretation. (See J. Y. Interpretations Nos. 185 and 201)　This Court in J. Y. Interpretation No. 582 holds that the Supreme Court precedents, i.e., Precedent S.T. No. 2423 (Sup. Ct., 1942) and Precedent T.S.T. No. 419 (Sup. Ct., 1957), in holding that a statement made by a co-defendant against himself may be admitted into evidence supporting the determination of facts related to another co-defendant, are inconsistent with Articles 16 and 8-I of the Constitution and, therefore, those portions of the opinions as given in the aforesaid two precedents, as well as in other precedents with the same holding, which are not in line with the intent described in the said interpretation, should no longer be cited and applied.　As regards the clause that “other precedents with the same holding”…shall no longer be cited and applied, it is an elaboration developed through J. Y. Interpretations Nos. 185 and 201.　Furthermore, it should be noted that Articles 173-I (iii) and 273-I of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended and promulgated in 1935 were amended on January 28, 1967, and renumbered as Articles 186 (iii) and 166-I of said Code, the provisions of which, however, remain the same.　When the said provisions were later amended and promulgated on February 6, 2003, the former provision was deleted whereas the latter was revised.　The Petitioner of this Interpretation, therefore, has requested that a supplementary interpretation be given as to the exact meaning of the phrase “other precedents with the same holding” mentioned above, as well as to the constitutionality of Articles 173-I (iii) and 273-I of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended and promulgated in 1935.　This Court, however, has found it unnecessary to render any supplementary interpretation in this regard.　Moreover, since Article 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended and promulgated in 1935, Articles 156-II, 1st half of 159-II, 159-1, 159-2, 159-4, 159-5, 206, 273-2 and 287-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure now in force, the proviso of Article 7-3 of the existing Enforcement Act of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 15-II of the Sexual Assault Prevention Act, Article 10-II of the Child and Juvenile Sex Transaction Prevention Act, Article 28-II of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Article 12 of the Organized Crime Prevention Act, as well as the exceptions to the hearsay rule for transcripts given by a secret witness under the Gangster Prevention Act, were not meant to be covered by J. Y. Interpretation No. 582, no issue should arise as to the necessity of giving a supplementary interpretation for the aforesaid provisions.　Therefore, in respect of the petition for a supplementary interpretation as to those provisions, this Court shall rightfully dismiss.