Interpretation J.Y. Interpretation  NO. 230  Date 1988/8/5 Issue It is held by the Administrative Court in its precedent that a mere description of facts or statement of reasons made by a government agency is not an administrative act within the meaning defined in the Administrative Appeal Act and that no administrative appeal against such description or statement is legally permissible. Does this precedent impose a limitation on the right of the people under the Administrative Appeal Act and thereby contradict Article 16 of the Constitution? Holding 　　Under Article 1 of the Administrative Appeal Act, the prerequisite for the institution of an administrative appeal is that there exists an administrative act, and the term "administrative act" is expressly defined in Article 2 thereof. The Supreme Administrative Court held in Precedent T.T. 41 (Supreme Administrative Court, 1973): "A mere description of facts or statement of reasons made by a government agency does not constitute an approval or disapproval given to an application submitted by any citizen, nor does such description or statement result in any legal effect. It is therefore not an administrative act within the meaning defined in the Administrative Appeal Act. Consequently, no administrative appeal against such description or statement is permissible under law." The decision is only a logical construction of the text of the Administrative Appeal Act and does not contradict Article 16 of the Constitution. Reasoning 　　While the people have the right to make an administrative appeal or bring a lawsuit under Article 16 of the Constitution, the process for conducting administrative litigations is governed by law. The Administrative Appeal Act provides in Article 1, the first sentence: "A person who believes that an administrative act of a central or local government authority is unlawful or improper, thereby causing injury to his right or interest, may institute an administrative appeal or re-appeal under this Act." Article 2, Paragraph 1, of the same Act states: "The term 'administrative act' used in this Act means a unilateral administrative act taken by a central or local government authority in the exercise of its function in respect of a specific matter, with the effect in public law." Paragraph 2 of the same Article says: "The omission of an act by a central or local government authority in response to a lawful application of the people, to which such authority is legally bound to act within the statutory period, thereby causing damage to the right or interest of any person, is deemed to be an administrative act." These provisions are designed to require the existence of an administrative act or a deemed administrative act of an administrative authority in respect of a specific matter, with the effect in public law, as a prerequisite for the institution of an administrative appeal. Similarly, Article 1 of the Administrative Proceedings Act provides that the essential element for the institution of administrative litigations is that a person's right is injured by an administrative act and that he is dissatisfied with the decision made upon his petition for remedy filed in pursuance of the administrative appeal procedure. The principle embodied in the foregoing provision is similar to the doctrine generally accepted among nations with a mechanism for administrative litigations. The Supreme Administrative Court held in Precedent T.T. 41 (Supreme Administrative Court, 1973): "A mere description of facts or statement of reasons made by a government agency does not constitute an approval or disapproval given to an application submitted by any citizen, nor does such description or statement result in any legal effect. It is therefore not an administrative act within the meaning defined in the Administrative Appeal Act. Consequently, no administrative appeal against such description or statement is permissible under law." The decision is only a logical construction of the text of the Administrative Appeal Act and does not contradict the essence of our J. Y. Interpretation No. 156, nor does it impose any limitation on the right of the people under the Administrative Appeal Act. Thus, we do not find it to be contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution.　 Translated by Raymond T. Chu.